





KATEDRA HOSPODÁRSKEJ POLITIKY

CENTRUM PRE EKONÓMIU A FINANCIE

NÁRODNÁ BANKA SLOVENSKA EUROSYSTÉM



21. November 2012

Gerhard Sorger

University of Vienna Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem

Abstract

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic non-cooperative game between separate, discretionary fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.

Venue: University of Economics in Bratislava, new building, room C1.06, Dolnozemská 1, Bratislava

- Date: 21. November 2012
- Program: 15:00 Gerhard Sorger: Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem 16:30 coffee