





## CENTRUM PRE EKONÓMIU A FINANCIE



12. December 2012

## Maroš Servátka

University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Reciprocal Responses to Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission

## **Abstract**

Both the law and culture make a central distinction between acts of commission that overturn the status quo and acts of omission that uphold it. In everyday life acts of commission often elicit stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. In this paper we compare reciprocal responses to both types of acts and ask whether behavior of subjects in two experiments is consistent with existing theory. The design of the experiments focuses on the axioms of revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) that make it observationally distinct from other theories, Axiom R (for reciprocity) and Axiom S (for status quo). We find support for this theory in both experiments.

Venue: University of Economics in Bratislava, new building, room C1.06,

Dolnozemská 1, Bratislava

Date: 12. December 2012

Program: 15:00 Maroš Servátka: Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Reciprocal

Responses to Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission

16:30 coffee