

# Voting and the provision of public goods

## Abstract

This lecture is targeted at Phd students and advanced Master students in economics. It uses an experimental economics approach to discuss the effectiveness of sanction regimes in the provision of public goods. A special emphasis will be on a potential “dividend of democracy” which results from increased voluntary compliance with obligations to contribute to a public good (e.g., tax payments) when sanctions for non-compliance have been approved in a majority vote rather than externally imposed. The lecture argues that imposing sanction regimes is no guarantee for the efficient provision of public goods, and that civic engagement is needed to keep the state accountable.

## References

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3. Markussen, T. and Tyran, J.-R (2023): A Dividend of Democracy in Cooperation Games. In preparation.
4. Tyran, J.-R. and Feld, L. (2006): Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 108(1): 135-56.