Profesor z Univerzity vo Viedni, Gerhard Sorger, prijal pozvanie na Bratislava Economic Seminar, kde prispel prednáškou na tému: Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem. Počas svojho vystúpenie prezentoval výsledky výskumu ohľadom nezávislosti centrálnych bánk a nástrojmi, ktoré ma centrálna banka k dispozícii.
Abstract
We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic non-cooperative game between separate, discretionary fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers’ objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.
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